Micklewright, John and Nagy, Gyula The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: evidence from a field experiment. NCRM Working Paper. Department of Quantitative Social Science, Institute of Education. (Unpublished)
Programme administration is a relatively neglected issue in the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups. Treatment increases the monitoring of claims - claimants make more frequent visits to the employment office and face questioning about their search behaviour. Treatment has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.
|Item Type:||Working Paper (NCRM Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||1. Frameworks for Research and Research Designs > 1.12 Case Study|
|Deposited By:||ADMIN user|
|Deposited On:||28 Jul 2010 11:07|
|Last Modified:||29 Sep 2010 18:06|
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