

Microeconomic Policy Evaluation

Instrumental Variables

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A simple model of potential outcomes

- Simple binary treatment 0/1 for untreated (or treatment 0) and treated (or treatment 1), respectively
- d_i represents the “treatment status” of individual i
- Each individual has two counterfactual outcomes, y_i^0/y_i^1 , depending on treatment status
- We define

$$\begin{aligned}y_i^0 &= \beta + u_i \\y_i^1 &= \beta + \alpha_i + u_i\end{aligned}$$

- The observed outcome of individual i is y_i

$$\begin{aligned}y_i &= y_i^0 + d_i (y_i^1 - y_i^0) \\ &= \beta + d_i \alpha_i + u_i\end{aligned}$$

The treatment effect

- Wish to assess impact of treatment relative to no treatment on the outcome y
- For individual i this is $\alpha_i = y_i^1 - y_i^0$: individual level causal effect
- *Missing data problem*: the treatment effect (α_i) or the two potential outcomes (y_i^0, y_i^1) cannot be directly measured for any individual
- We can hope to identify some features of the distribution of treatment effects, but not the individual treatment effect

- Two main difficulties faced by evaluation studies
 - 1 The treatment effect, α_i , is heterogeneous
 - 2 Selection into treatment may depend on both counterfactual outcomes, (y_i^0, y_i^1) , and thus on the gain from treatment, α_i
- Evaluation methods tend to be designed to identify some feature of the distribution of α_i
- We will start by focusing on the ATT but will then move to other moments of the distribution of the treatment effect

Identification issues

Illustration: Ordinary Least Squares

- Consider an iid sample $\{(y_i, d_i)\}_{i=1, \dots, N}$ and the linear regression $y_i = \beta + \alpha d_i + e_i$. The OLS estimator of α is

$$\hat{\alpha}^{OLS} = \frac{\frac{1}{N} \sum_i y_i d_i - \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_i y_i \sum d_i}{\frac{1}{N} \sum_i d_i^2 - \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum d_i\right)^2}$$

which identifies the parameter

$$\alpha^{OLS} = E[\alpha_i | d_i = 1] + E[y_i^0 | d_i = 0] - E[y_i^0 | d_i = 1]$$

- Heterogeneity: the first term is $ATT = E[y_i^1 | d_i = 1] - E[y_i^0 | d_i = 1]$
- Selection bias: the second term suggests treated and untreated are different
- Selection on the unobservables*: conditioning on observables X may not change this result

Instrumental Variables

Motivation

- IV directly addresses the problem of *selection on the unobservables*
 - Selection creates compositional differences between treated and untreated
- IV solution: find variable(s) Z affecting selection but not outcomes
 - Changes in Z induce changes in treatment status without affecting outcomes
 - Under certain conditions, variation in Z can be used to compare otherwise identical individuals and identify the treatment effect
 - Z are the *exogenous instruments*
 - Similar to a “natural experiment”: find an event ($z = 0,1$) that assigns individuals to treatment randomly

- Omit observed variables: assume alignment of observed covariates
- Consider single instrument z for simplicity
- The selection model of outcomes is

$$\begin{aligned}y_i &= \beta + \alpha_i d_i + u_i \\ &= \beta + \alpha d + \underbrace{[u_i + d_i(\alpha_i - \alpha)]}_{=e_i} \\ d_i &= \mathbf{1}[g(z_i, v_i) \geq 0]\end{aligned}$$

- Selection on the unobservables: (e, v) are related: (α, v) and/or (α, v) *not* independent

Classical instrumental variables

Homogeneous treatment effects

- The outcome equation simplifies to

$$y_i = \beta + \alpha d_i + u_i$$

- If z unrelated to y other than through d

$$\begin{aligned} E(y_i | z_i = z) &= \beta + \alpha P(d_i = 1 | z) + E(u_i | z) \\ &= \beta + \alpha P(z) \end{aligned}$$

- Choose z^* and z^{**} such that $P(d_i = 1 | z^*) \neq P(d_i = 1 | z^{**})$ and contrast the 2 groups

$$E(y_i | z^*) - E(y_i | z^{**}) = \alpha [P(z^*) - P(z^{**})] \quad \text{implying} \quad \alpha^{IV} = \frac{E(y_i | z^*) - E(y_i | z^{**})}{P(z^*) - P(z^{**})} = \alpha$$

- If z continuous it is more efficient to use all its variation

$$\text{cov}(y, z) = \alpha \text{cov}(d, z) + \text{cov}(u, z) \quad \text{implying} \quad \alpha^{IV} = \frac{\text{cov}(y, z)}{\text{cov}(d, z)}$$

Classical instrumental variables

Identification assumptions

- Identification hinges on 3 assumptions
 - 1 Homogeneity: $\alpha_i = \alpha$ for all i
 - 2 z determines participation: $P(d_i = 1 | z^*) \neq P(d_i = 1 | z^{**})$ (or g is a non-trivial function of z)
 - 3 Exclusion: $E(u|z) = E(u)$
- When are these assumptions violated?
 - returns from treatment unlikely to be homogeneous
 - weak instruments - if z has insufficient variation or is weakly related to $d \rightarrow$ imprecise estimates of α
 - may be difficult to find data on a variable that does not affect simultaneously d and y

Classical instrumental variables

Heterogeneous treatment effects

- The general model of outcomes is

$$y_i = \beta + \alpha d + \underbrace{[u_i + d_i(\alpha_i - \alpha)]}_{=e_i}$$

- Classical IV now identifies

$$\alpha^{IV} = \alpha + \frac{E(e_i | z^*) - E(e_i | z^{**})}{P(z^*) - P(z^{**})}$$

unless the IV condition $E(y_i | z_i = z) = \beta + \alpha p(z)$ still holds, meaning

$$\begin{aligned} E(e_i | z_i = z) &= E(u_i | z_i = z) + P(d_i = 1 | z)E(\alpha_i - \alpha | d_i = 1, z_i = z) \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

- In particular, the IV condition requires individuals not to have, or not to act upon, information about their own idiosyncratic gains
- Violation of the classical IV condition means z affects outcomes through ways other than d

The Local Average Treatment Effect

- Homogeneity (or ignorance) is not compelling: individuals expected to use more and better information about their own potential outcomes than can be observed
- Under an additional assumption, Imbens and Angrist (1994, Econometrica) offer an interpretation to the IV estimator: LATE
 - Suppose there exists a variable z capable of inducing individuals to change treatment status for reasons unrelated to potential outcomes
 - Imagine having data on 2 groups with different realisations of z but otherwise similar
 - Observed differences in mean outcomes can then be attributed to differences in participation rates due to z only
 - In special cases, such differences can be used to identify the impact of treatment on the subpopulation of compliers

- Remember the model of outcomes

$$y_i = \beta + \alpha d + \underbrace{[u_i + d_i(\alpha_i - \alpha)]}_{=e_i}$$

- Consider a binary instrument ($z = 0/1$) such as an exogenous policy reform
- Define the function d_{iz} as the treatment status of individual i under policy z :
 $d_{iz} = 1(g(z, v_i) > 0)$
- LATE requires stronger assumptions than classical IV to compensate for the lack of homogeneity
 - z determines participation (g is a non-trivial function of z - IV2)
 - Exclusion: $E(u_i|z) = E(u_i)$ (IV3)
 - (α, v) are jointly independent of z

- Assumptions 2 and 3 impose
 - potential outcomes (y^0, y^1) are not affected by the policy regime
 - z is exogenous in the participation equation

$$\begin{aligned}p(d_i = 1 | z_i = z) &= P(g(z, v_i) > 0) \\ &= P(d_{iz} = 1) = P(z)\end{aligned}$$

- And can be used to derive

$$\begin{aligned}E(y_i | z_i = z) &= \beta + P(d_i = 1 | z) E(\alpha_i | d_i = 1, z) \\ &= \beta + P(d_{iz} = 1) E(\alpha_i | d_{iz} = 1)\end{aligned}$$

- Contrasting the policy regimes under additional assumption 1:

$$\begin{aligned}E(y_i | z_i = 1) - E(y_i | z_i = 0) \\ = P[d_{i1} - d_{i0} = 1] E[\alpha_i | d_{i1} - d_{i0} = 1] - P[d_{i1} - d_{i0} = -1] E[\alpha_i | d_{i1} - d_{i0} = -1]\end{aligned}$$

- Contrasting the policy regimes under additional assumption 1:

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- The above expression is useless unless
 - homogeneous effects: $E(y_i | z_i = 1) - E(y_i | z_i = 0) = P[d_{i1} \neq d_{i0}] E[\alpha_i]$
 - impose additional monotonicity assumption
- *Monotonicity*: $d_{i0} \geq (\leq) d_{i1}$ for all i (with strict inequality for some i)
- This is to say that either $P[d_{i1} - d_{i0} = 1] = 0$ or $P[d_{i1} - d_{i0} = -1] = 0$, but not both
- Notice that an index restriction in the participation rule (meaning v is additively separable) implies the monotonicity assumption

- Suppose $p[d_{i1} - d_{i0} = -1] = 0$
 - any ($z = 0$)-participant is also a ($z = 1$)-participant
 - Then

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha^{LATE} &= E[\alpha_i \mid d_{i1} - d_{i0} = 1] \\ &= \frac{E(y_i \mid z_i = 1) - E(y_i \mid z_i = 0)}{P(z_i = 1) - P(z_i = 0)}\end{aligned}$$

- Local assumptions and local parameters
- Controversy surrounding LATE
 - shows IV can be meaningless when effects are heterogeneous
 - if monotonicity assumption justified, LATE can be an interesting approach to compare two policy regimes
 - but in general results are instrument-dependent and LATE measures effects on a not clearly defined population
 - interpretation particularly cumbersome when z continuous

Marginal Treatment Effects

Motivation

- We have studied two different parameters - ATT and LATE
 - both averages over parts of the distribution of treatment effects
 - makes it difficult to interpret and synthesise results
- How they relate to each other is formalised by the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE)
 - First introduced by Bjorklund and Moffit (1987) to quantify the impact of treatment on individuals just indifferent about participation
 - Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2006) use the MTE as a unifying parameter in the treatment effect literature
 - basis for definition of all other average treatment effect parameters
 - and for their interpretation
 - They notice LATE can be measured for infinitesimal changes in the instrument z to form the MTE

- Consider a continuous instrument, z
- And the selection model of outcomes after imposing an index restriction on the selection rule

$$y_i = \beta + \alpha d + \underbrace{[u_i + d_i(\alpha_i - \alpha)]}_{=e_i}$$

$$d_i = \mathbf{1}[v_i < g(z_i)]$$

- For a given value z
 - participants are those drawing $v_i < g(z)$
 - the marginal (indifferent) participant draws $v_i = g(z)$
- MTE: effect on individuals drawing a specific value of v , say $g(z)$

$$E(y_i^1 - y_i^0 | v_i = g(z)) = E(\alpha_i | v_i = g(z)) = \alpha^{MTE}(g(z))$$

MTE: convenient representation

- Assume we are under the LATE assumptions 1 to 3 together with the index restriction
- Let F_v be cdf of v and write

$$\begin{aligned}P(z) &= P(v_i < g(z)) \\ &= F_v(g(z))\end{aligned}$$

- Under the index restriction

$$v_i < g(z) \Leftrightarrow F_v(v_i) < F_v(g(z)) \Leftrightarrow \tilde{v}_i < P(z)$$

where $\tilde{v} = F_v(v)$ follows a uniform $[0,1]$ distribution

- Now, for a given z and $p = P(z)$:
 - a participant is someone drawing \tilde{v}_i below $p = P(z)$
 - indifference regarding participation occurs at $\tilde{v}_i = p$
 - MTE redefined as the impact of treatment at a point p in the distribution of \tilde{v}

$$\alpha^{MTE}(p) = E(\alpha_i | \tilde{v}_i = p)$$

MTE: convenient representation

- MTE independent of z since z contains no information on expected gains after conditioning on \tilde{v} (LATE assumptions)

$$\alpha^{MTE}(p) = E(\alpha|\tilde{v} = p, z) \quad \text{for any value } z$$

- Thus MTE is the average impact of treatment on individuals drawing a specific value of \tilde{v} , irrespective of z
- But for those indifferent at p - meaning $z : \tilde{v} = p = P(z)$

$$\alpha^{MTE}(p) = E(\alpha|\tilde{v} = p, P(z) = p)$$

- This expression justifies the interpretation of MTE as the impact of treatment on individuals at the margin of participation
- It also supports the identification strategy using LIV

- Under LATE assumptions 2 and 3 together with additive separability of v

$$\begin{aligned} E(y_i|z_i = z) &= \beta + P(z_i) E(\alpha_i|z, d_i = 1) \\ &= \beta + P(z_i) E(\alpha_i|\tilde{v}_i < P(z)) \\ &= E(y_i|P(z)) \end{aligned}$$

- Further imposing the first LATE assumption and contrasting two points in the domain of z , say (z^*, z^{**})

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha^{LATE}(z^*, z^{**}) &= \frac{E(y|z^*) - E(y|z^{**})}{P(z^*) - P(z^{**})} \\ &= \frac{E(y|P(z^*)) - E(y|P(z^{**}))}{P(z^*) - P(z^{**})} \end{aligned}$$

- Taking the limits as z^* and z^{**} become arbitrarily close

$$\alpha^{LIV}(P(z)) = \frac{\partial E(y|P(z))}{\partial P(z)}$$

- LIV stands for Local IV - a formulation of the MTE parameter using individuals at the margin of participation at $P(z)$

- The derivation of LIV suggests an estimation procedure for the local MTE
 - ① estimate $P(z)$ and compute the predicted values \hat{p}
 - ② regress y on $P(z)$ non-parametrically - say using local polynomials
 - ③ differentiate with respect to $P(z)$
- If z can induce variation in $P(z)$ over the full support $(0, 1)$, it is possible to estimate the whole distribution of MTEs
- In which case all population parameters can be derived from from the MTE

Recovering the ATT requires a little more work.

- At each point p , the ATT is the impact of treatment on participants at such propensity score:

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha^{ATT}(p) &= \int_0^p \alpha^{MTE}(\tilde{v}) dF_{\tilde{v}}(\tilde{v}|\tilde{v} < p) \\ &= \int_0^p \alpha^{MTE}(\tilde{v}) \frac{1}{p} d\tilde{v}\end{aligned}$$

- and the overall ATT is

$$\alpha^{ATT} = \int_0^1 \alpha^{ATT}(\tilde{v}) f_p(p|d=1) dp$$

- An estimator of the ATT is the empirical counterpart of the above parameter